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Abstract The peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer purports to describe a scenario in
which a subject has a justified belief, indeed knowledge, despite the fact that their
belief is not causally or counterfactually sustained by any good reasons for it. The
case has proven controversial. While some agree with Lehrer’s assessment of the
case, others disagree, leading to a schism among accounts of the basing relation. In
this paper I aim to reconcile these camps and put simple causal and counterfactual
accounts of the basing relation back on the table, by arguing that Lehrer’s case is
probably metaphysically impossible, but even if it isn’t, it is ambiguous between a
psychologically implausible and a psychologically plausible reading, and this can
account for the diverging intuitions that it generates.
Keywords Epistemic basing relation · Basing relation · Doxastic justification ·
Gypsy lawyer
1 Introduction
It is a truism that a belief is only justified or knowledge if it is based on the right kinds of
reasons or evidence. Unfortunately, there is very little agreement as to what exactly is
required for a belief to be based on a particular reason. Early accounts invoked simple
causal or counterfactual relations between belief and basis, but in 1971 Lehrer derailed
these accounts with an example which he claimed shows a belief that is justified, and
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amounts to knowledge, even though it is not causally or counterfactually related to
any good reasons.
Although controversial, many have been persuaded by Lehrer’s example and it
has shaped the landscape, creating a schism between those who agree with Lehrer’s
verdict on the case versus those who do not. This has led to a situation whereby it is
impossible for any account of the basing relation to gain widespread support, because
no account can satisfy both of these factions.
However, I will argue that the importance of Lehrer’s case has been overestimated.
Given some plausible metaphysical assumptions, the case he describes turns out to be
impossible. But even without these assumptions, the case is psychologically highly
implausible when understood in the way Lehrer requires. Therefore we can reasonably
suppose that intuitions regarding the case diverge because people are in fact consider-
ing two different versions of the case: one psychologically plausible, and the other not.
But either way, this case does not present a counterexample to causal or counterfactual
accounts of epistemic basing.
2 The epistemic basing relation
Holmes and Watson investigate
Holmes believes that the butler did it. In fact, he knows that the butler did it:
footprints at the scene show that the culprit had size eleven feet, no-one but the
staff were in the house at the time, and the butler is the only one with size eleven
feet. Watson has been with Holmes every step of the way and so has seen and
heard everything that Holmes has. Watson also believes that the butler did it, but
Watson hasn’t put the clues together like Holmes has. He believes that the Butler
is guilty because he believes in phrenology (contrary to scientific consensus),
and concludes that the butler’s pointed head and prominent brow are clear signs
of his criminal nature.
Holmes and Watson both believe that the butler did it. Moreover, since they have both
seen and heard everything necessary to solve the case, they both have evidence proving
that the butler did it, so the proposition ‘the butler did it’ is justified for both of them.
But clearly while Holmes knows that the butler did it and his belief to that effect is
entirely justified, Watson does not know that the butler did it and his belief to that
effect is utterly unjustified. (We can call the sense in which the proposition ‘the butler
did it’ is justified for both of them propositional justification, and the sense in which
Holmes’ belief is justified, but Watson’s is not, doxastic justification. It is the latter
kind of justification which matters for present purposes.)1
The difference between Holmes and Watson is that Holmes believes for the right
reasons, his belief is based on good evidence, whereas Watson believes for the wrong
reasons, his belief is based on irrelevant facts about the shape of the butler’s skull. The
difference is a perfectly commonsensical one and it makes all the difference from an
1 This kind of distinction has been made many times, it has been put by saying that a belief can be proposi-
tionally justified but not doxastically justified (e.g. Firth 1978), justifiable but not justified (Pollock 1986),
justified but not well-founded (Conee 1985), or ex ante justified but not ex post justified (Goldman 1979).
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epistemic point of view, since whether a belief is justified and whether it is knowl-
edge depends on what it is based on.2 It is therefore unsurprising that epistemologists
have put considerable time and effort into trying to work out exactly what this epis-
temic basing relation consists in. The obvious candidates are some kind of causal or
counterfactual relation, along the lines of the following.
Basic causal account
A belief that p is based on a basis b iff b causes, or causally sustains, the belief
that p.
Basic counterfactual account
A belief that p is based on a basis b iff, if it weren’t for b then you wouldn’t
believe that p (or b is a member of a set B, such that if none of the members of
B obtained then you would not believe that p).
These basic accounts may require some finessing in order to account for the possibility
of deviant causation or counterfactual support, but nonetheless it seems that the basing
relation has to be some kind of causal or counterfactual relation. After all, it seems
that the basis of a belief is what explains why one believes as one does, and causal
or counterfactual facts are the only kinds of things that can capture this explanatory
relation.3,4
If the story ended there then it would be a happy tale: there is an important epistemic
phenomenon (epistemic basing), and it seems that there is an obvious way of spelling
out what this amounts to (namely in causal or counterfactual terms), so a satisfactory
account of the phenomenon seems close at hand. But unfortunately this is not where
our story ends. In 1971, Lehrer proposed a counterexample to the then prevailing causal
account of the basing relation, and this example has been causing trouble ever since.
3 Lehrer’s lawyer
(In what follows, I present a slightly modified version of Lehrer’s case, in which the
order of events differs slightly. This makes no difference to the substance of the case,
but it makes my later exposition easier to state.)5
2 And beyond epistemology too. It seems like a close analogue is at play when we think about reasons for
action: if one’s decision to build a windfarm is based on a desire to get filthy rich, then it will be evaluated
very differently to if that decision were based on a desire to improve the lives of future generations. Cases
like Lehrer’s impact on this kind of basing relation too. Kvanvig’s (2003) Ill-motivated politician case
(which I consider in Sect. 10) is modelled on Lehrer’s and applied to reasons for action.
3 Accounts of the basing relation have been given in terms of causal relations (Moser 1989; Goldman
1979), dispositional relations (Turri 2011; Evans 2013), counterfactual relations (Swain 1981; Bondy 2015,
and doxastic relations, i.e. relations to meta-beliefs (Tolliver 1982; Leite 2008).
4 To the extent that the kinds of meta-beliefs proposed by doxastic accounts are able to provide an
explanation, they do so in virtue of their covariance with causal or counterfactual factors, but as we shall
see with respect to Lehrer’s example, the general consensus has been that these factors do not necessarily
covary.
5 In the original case, the lawyer becomes aware of the line of reasoning proving his client’s innocence
after the Tarot reading. But it is an important and explicit feature of the original case that even after spotting
the line of reasoning, the lawyer’s emotional investment is such that if it weren’t for the Tarot then he would
still believe his client to be guilty despite seeing the line of reasoning that proves they can’t be.
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The peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer
Monday: There has been a string of eight murders. A serial killer has been shown
to be guilty of the first seven murders, and is about to go on trial for the eighth.
A lawyer is tasked with defending the accused of this final murder, however,
the lawyer is very emotionally invested in the case and he has an overwhelming
desire to believe that the murderer of all eight victims has been found. As a result
he believes his client to be guilty (despite the lack of evidence either way).
Tuesday: The lawyer gets a call from a friend who works as a detective in the
police department. They explain that they have realised that the accused couldn’t
be guilty of the eighth murder, since it was impossible for them to have gotten
hold of the murder weapon in time. The lawyer is aware of the video footage and
facts about the case on which this line of reasoning depends, and he sees that
it entails that his client is innocent. However, given his emotional investment in
the case, he still does not believe that his client is innocent, instead continuing
to believe that he is guilty.
Wednesday: The lawyer is a superstitious man and regularly has a fortune-teller
read the Tarot for him. Today the cards say that his current client is innocent.
Given his strong faith in the power of the cards, he comes to believe that his
client is innocent and goes on to defend him publicly by pointing out that he
could not have gotten hold of the murder weapon (for exactly the reasons that
the detective demonstrated to him on Tuesday).
Lehrer claims that on Wednesday the lawyer knows (and is justified in believing)
that his client is innocent. If he is right then this spells serious trouble for causal and
counterfactual accounts of the basing relation.
The problem is that in order for the lawyer’s belief to be justified, and to be knowl-
edge, it has to be based on the right reasons. In particular it has to be based on the
line of reasoning which proves that his client could not have gotten hold of the murder
weapon and therefore cannot be guilty of this final murder (and not just based on the
bad reason that the Tarot cards have said that his client is innocent). But these good
reasons aren’t causally or counterfactually sustaining his belief: whether or not he is
aware of the genuinely justifying line of reasoning has no effect onwhether he believes
his client to be guilty. His belief is instead causally sustained by, and counterfactually
covaries with, the pronouncements of the fortune-teller: if the cards hadn’t told him
his client was innocent then he would not have believed it.
This implies that the basing relation cannot be a simple causal or counterfactual
relation.6 The lawyer’s belief is justified (and knowledge) and for that to be the case it
must be based on good reasons, but the lawyer’s belief is not causally or counterfac-
tually related to the good reasons available in this case. The basing relation therefore
cannot consist in a causal or counterfactual relation, but must instead consist in some
other (non-causal, non-counterfactual) relation that holds between the lawyer’s belief
and the line of reasoning that proves his client’s innocence.
6 Alternatively, one might conclude that basing is not required for justification, but given that we have
here been assuming that basing just is whatever relation one has to bear to good reasons in order to count
as justified or knowledgeable, that alternative isn’t available.
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4 The consequences of Lehrer’s case
Lehrer’s case has had a profound impact on subsequent investigation into the basing
relation. The case has been polarising.Anumber of commentators fail to shareLehrer’s
intuition that the lawyer’s belief is justified, while others agree squarely with Lehrer
that the lawyer’s belief is justified and that he knows his client to be innocent.7
Those who agree with Lehrer’s assessment of this case have either attempted to
formulate increasingly complicated kinds of causal and counterfactual accounts of the
basing relation which are compatible with the claim that the lawyer is justified, or else
they have developed alternative doxastic accounts of the basing relation.
The complicated causal and counterfactual theories that have been proposed face
the charge that they are simply ad hoc, involving an increasingly long list of (sometimes
disjunctive) conditions which seem designed purely to avoid counterexample.8 (This
kind of analysis is worryingly reminiscent of failed attempts to solve the Gettier
problem.)
Alternative doxastic accounts, meanwhile, face their own problems. According to
a basic doxastic account of the basing relation, a belief that p is based on b just in case
one holds the higher-order belief that b is a good reason to believe that p. There are
two distinct concerns regarding this account of the basing relation. Firstly, it threatens
to over-intellectualise epistemic basing such that infants and animals don’t count as
believing things on any basis whatsoever. And secondly, it fails to capture the sense
in which the basis of a belief is what explains why one believes as one does. To the
extent that the kinds of meta-beliefs proposed by doxastic accounts are able to provide
an explanation, they do so in virtue of their covariance with causal or counterfactual
factors, but the point of Lehrer’s example is that these factors can come apart (since
the lawyer recognises that the line of reasoning provides reason to believe even though
there is no causal or counterfactual relation to his belief).
Meanwhile, those who disagree with Lehrer and maintain that the lawyer lacks jus-
tification and knowledge have continued to develop causal and counterfactual accounts
of the basing relation which are not over-complicated or ad hoc.9 However, given that
these accounts entail that Lehrer’s lawyer lacks knowledge and justification, they are
out of line with a significant portion of people’s intuitions regarding the case and so
(unsurprisingly) they have failed to gain widespread support.
In sum, Lehrer’s lawyer presents a serious obstacle to attempts to analyse the epis-
temic basing relation. If one agrees with Lehrer that the lawyer knows that his client
is innocent, then they are forced into endorsing either a highly complicated account
of the basing relation, or a doxastic account according to which a subject’s belief can
be based on things which have nothing to do with why they believe as they do. And
7 Those who disagree with Lehrer include Goldman (1979), Swain (1981), Audi (1983), Pollock (1986),
and Wedgwood (2006). Recent defenders of Lehrer’s position on these cases include Bondy and Carter
(forthcoming), Kvanvig (2003), and Korcz (2000).
8 See Swain’s (1981) complicated causal plus pseudo-overdetermination account; the causal-doxastic
theory in Korcz (2000) is similarly complicated; and more recently Bondy (2015) has suggested an even
more complicated variation on the pseudo-overdetermination account.
9 See Wedgwood (2006), Turri (2011), McCain (2012), and Evans (2013).
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regardless of whether one agrees with Lehrer or not, no account of the basing relation
can be widely accepted so long as this case continues to divide opinion.
My response to this bind is to downplay the importance of the case that Lehrer
describes. It seems to me that it is very likely that Lehrer’s lawyer is impossible,
given what it is to hold the attitudes that he is described as holding. But even if
he is metaphysically possible, the way that Lehrer describes his lawyer is certainly
not psychologically plausible, i.e. human beings aren’t like that and we know that
they aren’t. Given this, we can offer a simple diagnosis of the divergent intuitions
that this case invokes: some intuitions about the case are being driven by responses
to psychologically plausible readings of the case, and others to the psychologically
implausible (or downright impossible) reading of the case which would be required in
order for it to form a genuine counterexample. But insofar as these different intuitions
are really about different cases, there is no problem in accounting for them both within
the framework of simple causal or counterfactual accounts of the basing relation.
5 The impossibility response
Lehrer’s lawyer is supposed to be a counterexample to causal and counterfactual
accounts of the basing relation. But in order to work as a counterexample, it has to be
a possible case. My preferred line of response is to claim that the case Lehrer describes
is in fact a metaphysical impossibility.
According to the peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer, on Tuesday the lawyer becomes
aware of an argument which proves that his client is innocent, he accepts the premises
of the argument, and he sees how it entails his client’s innocence, and yet he fails to
believe that his client is innocent (instead continuing to believe the opposite). This is
clearly very odd. Lehrer aims to explain this oddity by stating that the lawyer is ‘swayed
by emotional factors’10 into irrationally continuing to believe his client to be guilty.
But does this idea pass muster? Can one really continue to believe the premises of an
argument, see that it entails a conclusion, and still continue to believe the opposite?
I am of the view that one cannot; that given the nature of belief and what it is to see
that one thing follows from another, it is simply impossible for this situation to arise.
For instance, according to plausible views about the ‘aim of belief,’ truth is the (or
a) constitutive aim of belief,11 i.e. anything that is not aiming at truth is simply not
a belief (but rather some other kind of mental state). Of course there are questions
surrounding the sense of ‘aim’ at issue, and the term ‘belief’ may be used more or less
generously12 (so onemight or might not limit beliefs to states which aim at truth in any
substantial sense). For present purposes however we can specify the relevant claim as
follows: it is plausible that the kind of belief-like mental state required for knowledge
and justification is one which is truth oriented in at least the following sense—it is
responsive to clear, demonstrative, evidence when it is recognised as such. Anymental
10 Lehrer (1971, p. 312).
11 See, e.g. Velleman (2000), Wedgwood (2002), Chan (2013), and Whiting (2014) for discussion.
12 See Stevenson (2002) for a taxonomy of different kinds of beliefs or belief-like states.
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state which does notmeet this condition is just not the kind of state that is in the market
for knowledge or justification.
But when Lehrer’s lawyer continues to accept that his client is guilty while also
accepting that there is evidence which proves the opposite, his attitude does not meet
this condition and hence it cannot be a belief in the sense of foremost interest to
epistemologists. (It must instead be something else, like awishful thought or an alief,13
which is not the kind of thing that can be justified or knowledge.) Given what it is to
believe (in the sense required for knowledge and justification), nobody could believe
all of the things that Lehrer’s lawyer is supposed to.14
Similarly, according to a species of inferential or conceptual role semantics like
Peacocke’s,15 in order to count as possessing certain concepts (like conjunction and
disjunction), one has to find certain forms of inference compelling (e.g. conjunc-
tion elimination and disjunction introduction). Regardless of the broader ambitions
of inferential role semantics, it certainly seems that the use of certain concepts
requires a minimal competence with them (such as the cases of disjunction and
conjunction). And the case of Lehrer’s lawyer includes elements of this flavour. It
seems impossible for the lawyer to really see that the line of reasoning entails his
client’s innocence if he continues to believe the premises and yet does not come
to believe that his client was innocent. If he doesn’t believe the conclusion then
he hasn’t really seen that it follows, since he has failed to be minimally com-
petent with the concept of something following from something else in the way
required to count as exercising that concept. Truly appreciating the evidential force
of this argument just means coming to believe its conclusion (or else giving up one’s
beliefs in the premises). So if Lehrer’s lawyer continues to believe that his client
is guilty then he cannot have really appreciated the evidence like he is supposed
to.
Imagine the lawyer telling his detective friend ‘A and B are true, and I see that A and
B entail that my client is definitely innocent, but my client is guilty (not innocent).’
I am proposing that this is akin to claiming ‘it’s raining, but it’s not true that it’s
raining’ or ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe that it’s raining.’ It is not merely that you
are irrational if you believe these things; you literally cannot believe them. Either this
attitude is one which is not at all concerned with truth, so it is not a belief (at least not
in the sense that matters when we are concerned with the possibility of knowledge and
justification). Or else you have failed to grasp what it is for something to be true, what
it is to believe something, or (in the present case) what it is for something to follow
from something else, so spectacularly that your thoughts fail to be about truth, belief,
and entailment at all.
If either kind of metaphysical claim is right, then the case that Lehrer describes
is metaphysically impossible. Since impossibilities cannot be counterexamples, sim-
13 Gendler (2008) introduces aliefs, which are belief-like states that are unresponsive to evidence, and
indeed belief, of their falsehood. (For instance despite believing that one is safe on a glass bridge, one may
alieve that one is in danger; or despite believing that a sterilised bedpan is clean, one may alieve that it is
unclean.)
14 I am indebted to Duncan Pritchard for suggesting this line of argument.
15 See Peacocke (1989) as well as Brandom (1994), Boghossian (2003), and Wedgwood (2007).
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ple causal and counterfactual accounts of the basing relation are back on the table.
Moreover, there is a simple explanation for the divergent intuitions that people have
had regarding the status of the lawyer’s belief: intuitions that there is not knowledge
are being driven by certain features that the case is specified to have (namely that
there is not the right causal or counterfactual relation between the good evidence
and the belief), and intuitions that there is knowledge are being driven by other fea-
tures of the case (namely that the lawyer recognises the genuine line of reasoning;
or that he genuinely believes, in a way concerned with trying to reach the truth,
that his client is innocent—both facts which would entail that there is a causal or
counterfactual relation between the lawyer’s belief and good reasons for it).16 Both
kinds of intuitions get things right in all possible cases, but this is not a possible
case.17
(Despite the impossibility of this case however, there are possible cases which are
superficially similar andmerely involve irrationality—as wewill see shortly. The exis-
tence of actual cases like these maymislead us into supposing that Lehrer’s impossible
case is possible.)
6 The implausibility response
My preferred response is to claim that Lehrer’s lawyer is impossible. This is strong
medicine, it gets the job done but it requires signing up to some metaphysical claims
which may not be to everyone’s tastes. Perhaps some readers are of the view that it is
possible to be spectacularly irrational: to still count as believing that b and seeing that
p follows from b, even while believing that not-p.
Even if you are not convinced that the lawyer case is impossible, I hope you will
agree that understood literally it is psychologically highly implausible. Even if the
lawyer described by Lehrer isn’t a metaphysically impossible monster, he is still a
very strange beast. He apparently believes in a way that I would wager no actual
human being ever has.18
Of course, there are cases which are superficially similar. People are frequently
irrational. But when people are irrational, they are irrational in far more subtle ways
thanLehrer understands his lawyer as being. In fact, given justhow implausible the case
is when understood in the way required by Lehrer, I think that it should be considered
ambiguous between this psychologically implausible interpretation (which Lehrer
16 Note what Goldman (1979) says in rejecting the verdict that there is justification in this case ‘…I find
this example unconvincing. To the extent that I clearly imagine that the lawyer fixes his belief solely as
a result of the cards [my emphasis], it seems intuitively wrong to say that he knows—or has a justified
belief—that his client is innocent.’
17 Another upshot of this kind of impossibility response is that the kind of higher-order beliefs that doxastic
accounts of the basing relation are concerned with (e.g. that b is a good reason to believe that p) are sufficient
for basing, since they also imply the right kind of causal/counterfactual relation.
18 Wallbridge (2016) also argues that the basing relation is typically treated in a way which ignores
important psychological features. Although those issues are ignored here for simplicity, they are key to a
fully adequate account of the basing relation, and to solving the generality problem.
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requires in order for the case to work as a counterexample to causal and counterfactual
accounts of the basing relation) and more psychologically plausible interpretations.
Recall the situation in the middle of the case: the lawyer has before his mind the
line of reasoning which demonstrates his client’s innocence but (due to being ‘swayed
by emotional factors’) he continues to believe that his client is innocent. I think that
many of us would be inclined to interpret the situation so described as implying that
the lawyer is ‘in denial’ about the innocence of his client, where this means that he
knows (and believes) it really at some level of his psychology. (Andmerely has another
belief-like attitude, such as a wishful thinking or an alief, to the opposite effect.) But
note that, on this psychologically plausible rendering of the case, the lawyer’s belief
that his client is innocent is causally and counterfactually responsive to the evidence.
Although it is initially repressed by his emotional investment in the case and only later
unrepressed, he consistently believes that his client is innocent the entire time that he
has evidence to that effect.
The lawyer is still irrational on this interpretation of the case, but his irrationality
does not consist in not believing that his client is innocent, it consists in the way that
his emotional investment in the case causes him to repress the belief that his client
is innocent, and to have a delusion, wishful thought, or alief, that his client is guilty.
Later on, when he consults the Tarot cards, this delusion, wishful thought, or alief
is dispelled19 and the belief which was previously repressed then becomes explicit
(it also has an additional basis, the say so of the Tarot cards, but the fact that the
belief is over-based in this way does not prevent it from being justified or from being
knowledge, given that it is also based on perfectly good reasons).
So the lawyer’s attitudes towards his client’s innocence are shaped by three forces.
Firstly, there is the emotional investment which leads him to have the delusional
wishful thought that his client is guilty, and which represses any beliefs to the contrary.
Secondly, there is the justifying evidence which causes him to believe that his client is
innocent (although this belief is initially repressed). And thirdly, there is the evidence
of the Tarot which also causally sustains the belief that his client is innocent and, in
addition, dispels delusions to the contrary, thus allowing this belief to be explicitly
endorsed.
Depending on what combination of these three forces is present, the lawyer will
have different wishful thinkings, repressed and explicit beliefs. But each factor has
a distinct causal or counterfactual role. The emotional investment sustains a wishful
delusion which represses any contrary beliefs; the Tarot cards sustain a belief and
dispel any wishful delusions; and, most importantly, the evidence sustains a belief.
When the case is understood in this psychologically plausible way then, the claim
that the lawyer knows his client is innocent is entirely compatible with simple causal
or counterfactual accounts of the epistemic basing relation.
19 Of course, given the timeline in Lehrer’s original presentation of the case, the lawyer only notices
this evidence or line of argument after going back to the case once he has consulted the Tarot, but the
psychological dynamics are essentially the same. There are two bases for his belief that his client is innocent
(the good reasons and the bad reasons), and the Tarot cards also play an additional role in maintaining the
explicitness of that belief/knowledge, given the emotional investment that he has in the case.
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7 Other plausible renderings
According to the peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer, on Tuesday the lawyer becomes
aware of an argument which proves that his client is innocent, he accepts the premises
of the argument, and he sees how it entails his client’s innocence, and yet he fails to
believe that his client is innocent (instead continuing to believe the opposite). We have
already seen how this is so odd that one might even think that it is impossible. But even
if it is not impossible, it is not very psychologically plausible. On at least one much
more plausible alternative (considered above) it turns out that the case presents no
counterexample to causal or counterfactual accounts of the basing relation. However,
there are still other psychologically plausible renderings of Lehrer’s case, and it is
worth investigating whether any of these present a counterexample.
In the case as originally presented by Lehrer, the lawyer only finds out about the
line of reasoning that proves his client’s innocence after he has already been convinced
of their innocence by the Tarot cards, and hence there is no time at which the lawyer
is both aware of the argument for his client’s innocence and also believes them to be
guilty. However, although this situation does not actually arise in Lehrer’s original
case, it is essential to his case that this situation could arise:
Indeed, and this is the crucial point, if it were not for his unshakable faith in the
cards, the lawyer himself would be swayed by those emotional factors ... It is
only because of his faith in the cards that the reasoning gives him knowledge.
Therefore, the reasoning that gives him knowledge ... in no way supports or
reinforces his belief, but it does give him knowledge.20
In rearranging the timeline of Lehrer’s case as I have, I have been taking this passage
to indicate that without his faith in the cards, the lawyer would continue to believe that
his client is guilty (due to being ‘swayed by emotional factors’) despite still grasping
the line of reasoning which proves him to be innocent. However, an alternative reading
would be to interpret the claim that ‘it is only because of his faith in the cards that
the reasoning gives him knowledge’ as meaning that without his faith in the cards,
the lawyer would be unable to grasp the relevant line of reasoning and for that reason
would simply fail to believe that his client is innocent. (This would be a very natural
reading of Lehrer’s case, given that he describes the line of reasoning as being ‘very
complicated, though completely valid.’)
On such a reading, the case would involve a more psychologically plausible kind of
irrationalitywherebyhis emotional investment in the case leads him to fail to appreciate
the force of the line of reasoning laid out by his detective friend, and to (deludedly)
see it as misleading or insufficient. Or, in light of his emotional investment in the case,
he might minimise cognitive dissonance by irrationally doubting or dismissing the
premises of the argument (and only after the Tarot card reading come to appreciate
the true evidential weight of the argument that his client is innocent).
The problem with these psychologically plausible renderings of the case, however,
is that they cannot do the work that Lehrer requires because they don’t present a
20 Lehrer (1971, p. 312).
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counterexample to causal or counterfactual accounts of the basing relation. On these
interpretations, the lawyer believes his client to be innocent when he appreciates the
true evidential weight of this line of reasoning and he believes him to be guilty oth-
erwise. His appreciating the argument and accepting its premises is precisely what
causes him to believe it’s conclusion (it is just that whether or not he is in a posi-
tion to appreciate these grounds varies in irrational ways); his belief therefore is
causally and counterfactually related to his appreciating the line of reasoning which
proves his client to be innocent in just the way required by causal and counterfactual
accounts.
(And of course, the fact that he is required to have appreciated this line of rea-
soning, and not to doubt it, in order for it to causally or counterfactually support his
belief is not a problem for causal or counterfactual accounts. The fact that such back-
ground conditions have to be met is perfectly mundane: Sherlock’s belief that the
butler is guilty varies causally and counterfactually in ways perfectly compatible with
causal and counterfactual accounts of the basing relation despite the fact that there are
possibilities—indeed actual times—at which he has the relevant evidence but he does
not believe that the butler is guilty because he has not yet appreciated the relevant line
of reasoning.)
In order for Lehrer’s case to be capable of acting as a counterexample to causal of
counterfactual accounts, the lawyer therefore has to be understood in a psychologically
implausible (potentially impossible) way. And, as we shall see, this can help explain
the competing intuitions that the case inspires.
8 Intuitions and error theories
Thecase ofLehrer’s lawyer describes a psychologically highly implausible (or evenflat
out metaphysically impossible) kind of irrationality. However, the case is so implausi-
ble as to be ambiguous between the interpretation that Lehrer requires and alternative
interpretations which involve a more psychologically plausible (or indeed, metaphys-
ically possible) kind of irrationality. If the case is interpreted in one of these ways,
then the lawyer’s belief that his client is innocent is causally and counterfactually
related to the good reasons that he has for this belief. Given this, there is a credible
way to defend causal and counterfactual accounts of the basing relation from Lehrer’s
objection.
As the case is understood by Lehrer (or at least as it is required to be under-
stood in order for his argument to work), the lawyer’s beliefs really aren’t responsive
to the evidence, but only to the Tarot, and in this case the lawyer’s beliefs are not
based on the right kind of evidence so they are unjustified and not knowledge (contra
Lehrer’s claim). However, the lawyer in this case looks like he might be metaphysi-
cally impossible, and even if he isn’t impossible, the way in which he accepts vaguely
Moore-paradoxical claims (‘these truths prove that p, but not-p’) is wildly implausible.
This is very far removed from ordinary human psychology—even the irrational kind.
On any more plausible rendering of the case (according to which the lawyer represses
his beliefs, or dismisses or undervalues the evidence of his client’s innocence) the
lawyer’s beliefs are responsive to the evidence.
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A simple error theory can then be invoked to explain the intuition that Lehrer’s
lawyer knows that his client is innocent: this intuition is being driven by interpreting
the case in a psychologically plausible way, by exploiting the vagueness in Lehrer’s
presentation. Interpreted in such a way, the lawyer’s beliefs are based on good reasons
(but only because they are causally and counterfactually related to them).21
9 Conclusion
For a long time, the peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer has stood in the way of attempts to
understand the epistemic basing relation and prevented the possibility of any account
meeting with general approval. I have aimed to remove this obstacle via a two track
solution. For those willing to commit to certain plausible claims about the essentially
truth-oriented nature of belief, or the minimal competence required to count as appre-
ciating that b entails p, the response to the case is swift: Lehrer’s lawyer is impossible,
therefore this case poses no counterexample to causal or counterfactual accounts of
the basing relation.
For thosewho can’t stomach the taste of thismetaphysicalmedicine, there is another
response: if the lawyer really does continue to appreciate the evidential force of the
argument for his client’s innocence throughout and doesn’t harbour a repressed belief
in his client’s innocence, then he doesn’t know that his client is innocent. But this
lawyer is a strangebeast and it is difficult to imagine such apsychologically implausible
case. Amuchmore plausible rendering of the case is one inwhich the lawyer’s belief in
his client’s innocence is repressed, or he fails to appreciate the argument for his client’s
innocence, owing to his emotional investment in the case. In these versions of the case,
the lawyer does end up knowing that his client is innocent, but only because his beliefs
are causally or counterfactually sustained by good reasons. People’s willingness to
claim that the lawyer is justified can then be explained as a result of their intuitions
tracking the more plausible readings of the case, as opposed to the case as Lehrer
understands it, since his original presentation of the case left room for ambiguity.22
With Lehrer’s counterexample thus dealt with, philosophers are free to get back to
working on intuitive, well-motivated causal and counterfactual accounts of the basing
relation without having to worry about being lawyered. Moreover, with the divergence
of intuitions accounted for, there is now the possibility of reaching a broad consensus.
Next, in a final postscript, I will discuss how this treatment of Lehrer’s case fits
with a related case posed by Kvanvig.
21 A different tactic would be to point out that causal/counterfactual accounts of the basing relation are
sufficient to capture epistemic basing as it actually occurs for human beings, and isn’t that what we really
care about? However, I suspect that many philosophers would be inclined to reply that this is not what they
care about: that an account of the epistemic basing relation only captures what is important about epistemic
basing if it applies to all possible cases, not just those that are possible given the contingencies of human
psychology.
22 Again, it is instructive to recall what Goldman (1979) says, ‘To the extent that I clearly imagine that
the lawyer fixes his belief solely as a result of the cards [my emphasis], it seems intuitively wrong to say
that he knows—or has a justified belief.’
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10 Postscript, Kvanvig’s Ill-motivated politician
Interestingly, the basing relation does not seem to be limited to epistemology. The
same relation (or at least a similar one) is important in practical reasoning: just as
one’s beliefs are only justified if they are based on good reasons, so too one’s actions
are only justified if they are based on good reasons. With this in mind, Kvanvig (2003)
gives a case intended to parallel Lehrer’s lawyer, but in the practical domain.
Ill-motivated politician23
Stage One: ‘Jim is running for Congress, where this behavior is to be explained
by an irrational desire to prove his critics wrong.’ (Although he actually gives
good reasons for his standing when questioned.)
Stage Two: ‘Jim comes to realize his true motives. He has come to realize that the
reasons he has given for running are not what brings him to run for Congress.’ He
realises that the reasons he previously gave for his behaviour (i) did not originally
prompt the behaviour, (ii) have not, in the past, sustained the behaviour, and (iii)
do not now sustain the behaviour (they do not even enhance the probability of
his running, even controlling for the causal force of his irrational desire).
Stage Three: ‘Upon confronting these rather disturbing facts, Jim then reasons
as follows: “the inadequate motivations both past and present are regrettable and
everything possible ought to be done to alter them; but, until this alteration can be
accomplished, everything possible ought to be done tomaintain somemotivation
or other to keep running for Congress since, after all, it is nonetheless true that
I am extraordinarily good at convincing others of correct policy, that I am best
qualified to serve the constituents of this district, and if persons were to attempt
to quit doing everything which is done for inadequate reasons, not (as) much
good would be done.” So, Jim concludes, he ought to do all in his power to keep
the race for Congress alive in spite of his bad motivations.’
Kvanvig claims that Jimmakes rational progress during this course of events. In partic-
ular, Kvanvig claims that Jimmakes significant rational progress during stage three and
that the only kind of progress that he could count as making here is to move from ‘per-
forming a justified action to justifiably performing that action’.24 In other words, his
action (standing for Congress) comes to be based on the good reason that hewould best
serve his constituents. However, this is problematic for a causal account of the basing
relation, since Jim’s standing is not caused (or causally maintained) by this line of rea-
soning. Jim’s action is in fact caused by his irrational desire to prove his critics wrong.
McCain (2012, 2014), offers three possible responses to Kvanvig’s case: firstly,
it is possible to deny that justification for belief and action are parallel in the way
that Kvanvig suggests, and therefore the failure of a causal account of basing in the
practical domain need not undermine the plausibility of a causal account of basing in
the epistemic case. Secondly,McCain suggests that the rational progress Jimmakes by
formulating his reasoning in stage three could be accounted for without claiming that
23 Kvanvig (2003, pp. 50–51).
24 Kvanvig (2003, p. 61).
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he acts justifiably (in particular, he proposes that Jim comes to possess a reason such
thatwere he to act on that basis then his actionwould be justified). And thirdly, he notes
the possibility of denying that Jim hasmade any rational progress at all (at least when it
comes to practical rationality) since his reasoning in fact has no impact on his actions.
I am very sympathetic to the second and third kind of response. However, it will
be interesting to attempt to offer a treatment of this case which parallels the above
treatment of Lehrer’s lawyer.
The first line of response that I suggested to the case of Lehrer’s lawyer was that,
given certain plausible but not-uncontroversial assumptions, the case described is
impossible—and the same is true of Kvanvig’s politician. Jim is subject to akrasia,
or weakness of will: he judges that the (all things considered) best thing for him to
do is to stand for Congress and yet this does not lead him to stand (although it just
so happens that other, irrational, factors do lead him to stand). However, akrasia has
been thought by some (for instance Socrates in Protagoras or Hare 1952, 1963) to be
impossible. Hence, just as one might think that Lehrer’s lawyer is impossible because
it is impossible to believe that there is demonstrative proof for p while believing p to be
false, onemight think thatKvanvig’s politician is impossible because it is impossible to
believe that an action is best (all things considered), and yet act differently. Moreover,
one reason for holding this might be because one thinks that a bodily motion that is
not in line with one’s practical judgements is not an action (in the sense of interest),
in parallel to the thought that a mental state that is not responsive to the admitted
evidence is not a belief (in the sense of interest).
Of course these impossibility arguments require controversial metaphysical
assumptions, but I also noted that even if Lehrer’s lawyer isn’t impossible, they are psy-
chologically implausible—and the same can be said of Kvanvig’s politician. Kvanvig
states that at no stage in the proceedings do the good reasons even so much as increase
the probability of Jim’s standing (even once we control for his irrational desire), in
other words Jim is subject to a kind of total akrasia. It is not just that what he recog-
nises to be (all things considered) conclusive reasons for him to act are irrationally
outcompeted by some other motivations or desires, but these reasons have literally no
possible impact on how he acts. This is an odd kind of case, and not one that I think
has ever actually occurred (I take it that in actual cases of akrasia, the recognised best
course of action is in a position to play some motivating role, if it is not swamped by
other irrational urges).
If we were to recast Kvanvig’s case such that Jim’s akrasia was of some more
normal, non-total, kind then Jim could easily be seen to be making rational progress.
Jim’s coming to see the real value in what were previously only empty words to him
(e.g. ‘I am best placed to alleviate the suffering of the constituents’) would provide
some degree of causal support to his standing (even if not enough to actually overcome
akrasia and so lead to action), and this would lead to progress by bringing him closer
to a situation in which his action is based on good reasons.
Unfortunately, even though this more psychologically plausible rendering of Kvan-
vig’s case is compatible with a causal account of the basing relation, this fact cannot
be used to explain any divergent intuitions (as I proposed with the case of Lehrer’s
lawyer), since Kvanvig is explicit on this point (not ambiguous like Lehrer).However,
it is also not clear that this case provokes any divide in intuitions which would require
123
Synthese
explanation. I personally fail to share Kvanvig’s intuitions, and there are not (to my
knowledge) any published responses to the case which agree with Kvanvig, while
(McCain 2012, 2014) is very willing to deny that Jim acts justifiably. I will leave
readers to consult their own intuitions, but if I am right then given that Kvanvig’s case
is tightly described so as to make it entirely clear that there is no kind of causal or
counterfactual connection whatsoever, the case just fails to inspire the intuition that
Jim acts justifiably.
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